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From Legislature To Litigation:
The Real Medical Malpractice
Crisis
by Patti G. Zimmerman, Esq.

Despite a rare unanimity among plaintiffs counsel and defense attorneys alike
that the legislatively created Health Claims
Arbitration Office should be abolished,
the system has "celebrated" its ten year
anniversary and hardly an accolade was
heard. Instead, amendment after amendment is being heaped upon the statute to
create temporary plugs in the statutory
wall that is purported to be preventing a
veritable flood of medical malpractice litigation from reaching the circuit courts of
our state. The wisdom of this "band aid"
legislation is questionable, at best, and as is
demonstrated herein, may be in direct contravention of the stated purpose of the creation of the Health Claims Arbitration
Office - to reduce the cost of achieving resolution of medical malpractice claims
(including the cost of defending the claims)
with a corresponding reduction in
insurance rates. 1 Section 3-2A-01 et seq. of
the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article
(" Act") governs actions pending before
the Health Claims Arbitration Office.
Recent changes, however, have made the
system, in addition to being seen as ineffective in many cases, also unworkable. It is
these legislative ambiguities that have led,
and will continue to lead parties to seek
judicial intervention and interpretation steps that further increase the cost of
medical malpractice litigation.
The problem with the legislation first
manifests itself in the definitional section,
Section 3-2A-01. With the advent of
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HMOs and related prepaid health plans,
the statute provides no clear statement as
to inclusion or exclusion of such organizations under the definition of "health care
provider."2 It has, therefore, been for the
courts to resolve whether the statute
requires that a physician or nurse affiliated
with such an organization be subject,
exclusively, to the jurisdiction of the
Health Claims Arbitration Office, while
the "employer" is not and may only be
sued in the circuit court or federal district
court in the appropriate venue. See Group
Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104,
453 A.2d 1198 (1983). Such an interpretation results in the splitting of a cause of
action - a situation clearly contrary to the
concept of judicial economy. Defense of
what would ordinarily be a single claim, in
two judicial jurisdictions is not, however,
a new problem under the Health Claims
Arbitration statute. Following its enactment, the problem most frequntly arose
and still arises today, when the initial
injury to the claimant is in the nature of an
auto tort or products liability claim and
the treatment for the injury is alleged, foresee ably, to have been rendered negligently.
The inability of an HCA panel to obtain
jurisdiction over the manufacturer of a
product or over the driver of an automobile makes it impossible to have such a
claim resolved, initially, in a single trial.
The future course of this problem and the
cost ramifications may be frightening.
With the increase in the development and

use of medical products it is foreseeable
that more and more malpractice cases will
involve an entity which, under the statute,
is technically not a health care provider
and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Health Claims Arbitration
Office.
Further, as Maryland authorizes practice
by more and more para-professionals, the
definitional section of the Act gets more
and more outdated and, consequently,
unworkable - almost to the point of requiring that the statute be construed contrary
to the legislative intent of requiring all
health care providers, of any sort, to
initially, submit claims against them to
arbitration. For example, are CRNAs,
respiratory therapists, physician's assistants, psychologists, lab technicians (the
list grows longer), health care providers
under the statute? Do they render health
care? Could they fail to render health care?
Could they cause medical injury? Does not
the statute, on its face, giving it's required
plain meaning, exclude such individuals or
is it contrary to the intent to require that
an anesthesiologist who administers
anesthesia submit his claim to arbitration
while a CRNA, administering the very
same anesthesia, must defend him or herself, initially, in the circuit court.
The legislative ambiguities are far from
limited to the definitional section of the
statute. The state's highest courts have
been called upon on several occasions to
construe Section 3-2A-02, entitled "Exclu-

siveness of Procedures." While it is generally understood that the Act is meant to
relate to traditional malpractice cases only,
by drafting the statute in such a fashion
that it is said to apply to "[a]ll claims, suits
and actions ... by a person against a health
care provider for medical injury ... ,"3 the
legislature was inviting submission to arbitration any claims against physicians that
allegedly resulted in personal injury including claims which sounded in QSSault, battery, slander, etc. The applicability of the
statute has now been judicially, as compared to legislatively, limited to claims
arising from a violation of the health care
providers' professional duty to exercise the
appropriate care required for a health care
provider in a professional setting. See Can·
non v. McKen, 296 Md. 227,459 A.2d 196
(1983); Nichols v. Wilson, 296 Md. 154,460
A.2d 57 (1983).
Section 3-2A-03, while not the subject of
many appellate opinions, is often described as a procedural nightmare. With best
intention, that section mandates that a
panel be comprised of a lawyer (presumably to offer advice on legal issues), a health
care provider (presumably to offer advice
on medical issues), and a lay person (to
offer common sense?). Up until July 1,
1986 any member of the Bar could be
selected as panel chairman - the person
charged with making all legal rulings both
pre-trial and during trial. Recognizing that
potentially multi-million dollar law suits
were being decided by individuals who had
never seen the inside of a courtroom, this
section was recently amended to require
that the attorney be in the practice of law
in Maryland for three years. 4 Where, however, is it written that a panel chairman
must have tried a single case, made a single
objection, practiced in the area of general
negligence work or, be familiar with the
statute and the case law construing the statute? Is this amendment in the legislation
going to provide a solution to the problem
of ill-prepared attorneys acting as panel
chairmen and practicing outside of their
specialties?
And what of the health care provider
panelist? For years, although the legislation provided that the list from which
counsel were to select the panelist must, if
practicable, include at least one health care
provider from each recognized specialty
(presumably, although not written, each
recognized specialty, at issue), because of
the voluntary nature of the service on the
panels, because of the low compensation,
because of the great inconvenience, and
because of the time consuming nature of
the panel hearings, actively practicing physicians in the specialities involved who
could actually provide some medical infor

mation to the other panelists regarding the
applicable standards of care when the treatment was rendered, are almost never participating. Recognizing this shortcoming,
more amendments were made. Now every
physician who is licensed in this state and
who is a resident of this state is required to
be available to serve. Does this mean that
they shall serve? No. Does this mean that
if they do agree to serve that they must
appear? No. Does this guarantee or even
increase the probabilities that a specialist
that can offer insight into the litigation
will participate? No.
One of the most significant legislative
band aids was enacted in July of 1986
when Section 3-2A-04 was amended to
require the filing of a Certificate of a
Qualified Expert by the claimant within
90 days of the filing of suit, and by the
health care provider within 120 days of the

CCissues of
constitutionality
. have arisen
again."

claimant's filing. While, on its face, this
seems consistent with the statutory purpose and intent, issues of constitutionality
(which challenges the legislation, as a
whole, survived years ago)5, have arisen
again. Specifically, constitutional scholars
must question whether to require all
health care providers, if they wish to contest liability, to forward and find an expert
to support their care or to say that their
care did not proximately cause harm,
when the burden of proof is on the claimant, is appropriate. 6 And, lest we forget,
what about the hospital or other health
care providing institution who is merely
alleged to be vicariously liable? Can they
be required to go forward and find an
expert supporting their alleged employee's
care even though no employer-employee
relationship, in fact, exists? Further, one
must question the wisdom of establishing

the due date for the health care provider's
certificate based on the date of the filing of
the claimant's certificate and not upon
service. This anomaly often results in a
given defendant's certificate being due
under the statute before service of process
has been made.
And what about the certificates themselves? Where is the guidance as to their
contents? Must a claimant, in suing multiple physicians, file a certificate that says
each was negligent and that each proximately caused harm? May a health care
provider sign his own certificate? What of
the requirement that the attesting physician (who is frequently not testifying at the
Health Claims Arbitration hearing) be
available for discovery? What attorney, in
the routine case, would depose a physician
who is not going to appear? Is this consistent with efforts to reduce litigation costs,
or are all of these issues going to be beggingjudicial clarification and intervention?
It goes without saying that Section 3-2A06 entitled "Judicial review" has been an
area from which more appellate issues
have arisen than other aspect of the litigation. See, generally, Brothers v. Sinai Hospi·
ta~ 63 Md. App. 235, 492 A.2d 656 (1985);
Mitcherling 'V. Rosselli, 61 Md. App. 113,
484 A.2d 1060 (1984), affd, 304 Md. 363,
499 A.2d 476 (1985); Tranen 'V. AzzZ. 59
Md. App. 528, 476 A.2d 1170 (1984).
Despite that fact, however, in the past two
legislative sessions, little or no effort has
been made to streamline the appellate process for cases subject to the Health Care
Malpractice Claims Act despite the frequency with which these cases are appealed.
This commentary would be unfair if it
did not recognize some of the merits of the
Health Care Malpractice Claims Act and
the efforts of those administrating the Act
and practicing under the Act. It would,
likewise, be unfair not to comment on
recent legislative changes which are beneficial and consistent with the stated purpose
of the Act. For example, Section 3-2A02(c), for the first time, has been amended
to provide that, except as otherwise
indicated, the Maryland Rules of Procedure shall apply to practice under the subtitle. This issue, in the past, had been left
to the discretion of the panel chairperson.
Additionally, an amendment to Section 32A.(J6 provides for the admissibility of
depositions taken in connection with the
arbitration proceeding and mandating the
binding nature of previously filed Interrogatories, Requests for Admission of Fact
and Requests for Production of Documents, will, hopefully, reduce the discovery expenses assosciated with a de novo
appeal. Section 3-2A-07(a) providing for
Fal~
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the payment of costs of the proceeding and
reasonable expenses, including attorneys'
fees, by a party, an attorney, or both, if the
arbitration panel finds that maintaining
the proceeding or defending the proceeding is in bad faith or without substantial
justification, may deter frivilous law suits
and give the arbitration panel the same
power that has been afforded our circuit
courts in discouraging such litigation.
Finally, this commentary would not be
complete without acknowledging the
efforts of the 1987 General Assembly in
enacting
legislation
which,
while
applicable to medical malpractice cases, are
not part of the Health Care Malpractice
Claims Act. For example, the "remittitur
bill" which is applicable to medical malpractice cases only, allows, but does not
require, the court to receive evidence of
collateral source payments. Further, in the
area of malpractice, a change in the statute
of limitations with respect to the filing of
claims by a minor, will shorten the
number of years for which physicians
treating minors are at risk. Specifically, in
medical malpractice cases only, a claimant
must file suit either within three years
from the date of discovery or five years
from the date of injury, whichever is
shorter, once the claimant reaches 11 years
of age. Section 5-109 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated
Code of Maryland remains applicable to
medical malpractice cases and sets forth
the statute of limitations for adults and
remains applicable to minors when the
cause of action is related to foreign objects
left in the body or injury to the reproductive organs.
Conclusion
It remains to be seen whether the
attempted legislative resuscitation of the
Act will breathe new life into the
insurance industry or will result in a long
and painful death due to increasingly
expensive litigation.
Notes
Although the Health Care Malpractice Oaims Act
has remained in full force and effect for more than a
decade, Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society
of Maryland, the state's largest insurer of physicians,
continues, each year, to request and receive authorization for significant premium increases.
'It is one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction that provides that when the legislature has chosen to make express mention of one item in a definition, the exclusion of others is implied. In the case of
the Health Care Malpractice Oaims Act, the legislature listed as health care providers, a hospital, a physician, an osteopath, an optometrist, a chiropractor,
a registered or licensed practical nurse, a dentist, a
podiatrist, and a physical therapist.
• There are other issues lurking within the confines of
this section including, for example, where, jurisdictionally, one health care provider seeks indemnity or

1
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contribution from another health care provider
when the underlying litigation was traditional malpractice.
<This requirement is qualified, however, by Section 32A~3(c) (3) (ii) which provides that if the attorney's
name appeared on the list of persons willing to serve
before January I, 1986, then that person continues to
be eligible to serve.
-Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 174, appeal dismissed. 439 U.S. 805 (1978)
• Section 3-2A~4 (b) (2) provides, inter alia, that if the
defendant disputes liability and fails to file a cenificate within 120 days from the date the claimant filed
his cenificate, aU issues of liability will be
adjudicated against the defendant.
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act." Id. After both parties successfully had
the motion dismissed, Allstate appealed.
Writing for the majority in the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, Chief Judge
Gilbert found the vexing issue presented
by this case to be: "whether an insurer
may. .. after disposition of the tort matter, relitigate the same issues and obtain a
declaratory judgment... that overrides
the jury's verdict on the tort action." Id.
The court found that even though Allstate
was not a party to the tort action, it is nevertheless bound by the jury's verdict.
The court cited Brohawn 'Cl. Tran·
samerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d
854 (1975) as being similar with respect to
the conflict between an insurer and an
insured. The conflict in Brohawn arose out
of a complaint that alleged separate and
alternative theories of negligence and
assault and battery. The insurer insisted
because of the conflicting legal theories
averred against its insured, the extent of
policy coverage (due to an exclusionary
clause similar to the case here) should be
resolved prior to trial in a declaratory
action. Although the Brohawn court
noted, as did the court here, that the above
contention is not without merit, it held
that a declaratory action is inappropriate
where the questions of fact to be resolved
in the declaratory action are also to be litigated in the pending action. Id.
The court, in its application of Brohawn,
found that while an insurer's right to preliminary adjudication on an insured's right
to coverage under an insurance policy is
limited, it is not a compelling enough
reason to allow an insurer to adjudicate
issues that will be subsequently litigated at
trial. Allstate, 71 Md. App. at 1069, 523
A2d. at 1069.
The court further pointed out that
Brohawn as applied did not strip away all
of Allstate's defenses. To begin, the court
refused to read Brohawn as a bar to an
insurance carrier's ability to be a party to
the action. Nothing in the cited authority
forbids the carrier, after supplying independent counsel to its insured or paying
the cost of the insured's choice of counsel,
from intervening as a party and from being
represented at a tort trial.
Thus, to limit the more severe implications of this holding, the court placed the
locus of the blame on Allstate for its failure to intervene, not on Allstate being
denied its right to representation.
The court in AtUlood clearly indicates
that a more affirmative role should be
played by the insurance carrier in tort litigation in which a plaintiff pleads alternative legal theories of which one will be
excluded by the scope of the policy at trial.
Implicitly the court held firm in its unwil
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lingness to compromise a jury verdict on
an issue of liability, despite the fact that
extrinsic evidence may reveal that the
jury's finding may well fall into an
insurance carrier's exclusionary' provision.

.-Michael T. Wyatt
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